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Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability Is Not a
Viable Distinction
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal status of the unborn child and the rights of its
parents are unsettled areas of tort law.' Historically, courts did
not allow recovery when an unborn child was injured or killed.2
Over the past century, courts and legislatures in the United
States have expanded the scope of recovery for prenatal injury
and death.' Today, most jurisdictions recognize causes of action
for the injury of a fetus and for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus.4 However, most jurisdictions do not recognize a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus.5 This Com-
ment argues that viability is irrelevant in deciding whether to
allow a cause of action to the parents of a fetus that has been
wrongfully killed. Rather than barring all causes of action for
the death of a nonviable fetus, courts should ignore the arbitrary
line of viability and decide each case on its merits.
Viability is not an issue in actions for prenatal injury to
children who are subsequently born alive,6 and it is logically
inconsistent that viability should be an issue when the prenatal
injury results in the death of a fetus.7 This is especially true in
Washington, where the legislature has enacted a statute that
allows recovery to parents for grief and mental suffering because
of the injury or death of a minor child,8 and where the state
1. This issue as it arises in other areas of the law, such as criminal law and constitu-
tional law (abortion), is beyond the scope of this Comment.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 24-45.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-36. A viable fetus is a fetus that is "suffi-
ciently developed to live outside the uterus." STFDMAN'S MEDicAL DicTIONARY 1556 (5th
Unabridged Lawyer's ed. 1982).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 78-99.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
7. Most wrongful death statutes are based on the presumption that a cause of action
exists in favor of the named beneficiaries if the decedent would have had a cause of
action had he survived. See, e.g., Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 599, 537 P.2d 266,
267 (1975); Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wash. 2d 559, 564, 188 P.2d 82, 85 (1947), over-
ruled on other grounds, Sargent v. Selvar, 46 Wash. 2d 271, 280 P.2d 683 (1955).
8. The Washington Statute provides:
The mother or father or both may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury
or death of a minor child, or a child on whom either, or both, are dependent
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supreme court has held that a viable fetus falls within the terms
of the statute.9 The parents of a four-month-old fetus who is
wrongfully killed may suffer as much as the parents of a six- or
seven-month-old fetus.
This Comment reviews the history of tort law treatment of
the fetus who is wrongfully injured or killed.10 The Comment
discusses case history and wrongful death statutes, with a focus
on Washington law. 1 Finally, the Comment concludes that
,courts should ignore viability when deciding cases of fetal
wrongful death.
II. WRONGFUL DEATH
The right of recovery for the wrongful death of a person is a
statutory right.12 Consequently, recovery for the wrongful death
of a fetus depends upon the state's wrongful death statute and
the court's interpretation of that statute."
Historically, if the defendant's tort resulted in the death of
the victim, the tort was said to die with the victim."' The result
of the rule was that in the most severe tort cases the defendant
was absolved of liability."
for support....
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication
expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the
loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of
the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1983).
9. Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 599, 537 P.2d 266, 267 (1975). See infra notes
117-28 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 20-77.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 100-37.
12. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98-99, 300 So. 2d 354, 356-57
(1974); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 494, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1971). See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992,
993 (1967).
13. A particular problem involved in these cases is the need to determine whether
the fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the state's wrongful death statute. In some
jurisdictions, the statute may only require a determination of whether the fetus is a
"minor child" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.010 (1983).
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 901. In England in 1808, Lord Ellenborough held
that "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury." Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
15. "[It was more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch
him, and ... the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who
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In 1846 the English Parliament passed the first wrongful
death statute, Lord Campbell's Act, to remedy this situation.1
In the United States, state legislatures followed the British
example, and today every state has some form of wrongful death
statute.17
Most state wrongful death statutes are modeled after Lord
Campbell's Act and create a new cause of action for the death of
the victim."8 The action can be brought by the victim's personal
representative for the benefit of statutorily designated
beneficiaries.1 "
frequently were destitute, without a remedy." W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902.
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902. Lord Campbell's Act was also known as the
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
17. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970) (court discussed
the history of wrongful death actions in England and the United States and the broad
acceptance of recovery for wrongful death, and allowed a cause of action for wrongful
death in admiralty).
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902. Washington State has this type of wrongful
death statute. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, .24.010 (1983). See infra note 120.
Some states have wrongful death statutes that are like survival statutes. The sur-
vival-type statutes preserve the decedent's own cause of action and enlarge the cause of
action to include damages for the death of the decedent. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at
902. Actions under the survival-type wrongful death statutes are brought by the executor
of the decedent's estate, and recovery usually goes to the estate. Id. at 903-04.
Some states, including Washington, have both wrongful death statutes and survival
acts. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (1983). When the two actions can be brought and
maintained independently, there are sometimes problems of limiting damages so that the
defendant is not held liable twice for the same act. See, e.g., Criscuola v. Andrews, 82
Wash. 2d 68, 507 P.2d 149 (1973); Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659
(1942), overruled on other grounds, Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58
A.2d 323 (1948).
This Comment, when discussing wrongful death statutes, refers to statutes that are
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, rather than to survival acts. When discussing Wash-
ington statutes, the Comment refers to WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.20.010 and 4.24.010, rather
than to WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.046.
19. The amount of damages recoverable under wrongful death statutes varies. Typi-
cally, in states where compensation is based upon loss to the beneficiaries, the plaintiffs
must show some pecuniary loss. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 907. But many states
have modified the rule limiting damages for wrongful death to pecuniary loss. The modi-
fication may be done judicially by extending the meaning of pecuniary loss beyond strict
financial value. This involves speculation as to the decedent's life expectancy, character,
habits, and health. Id. at 908. See, e.g., Gaydas v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 536, 152 A. 549,
554 (1930) (court considered age, health, and life expectancy of deceased mother in
wrongful death action by children). The pecuniary loss rule has also been modified by
statutes, which either specify damages other than pecuniary damages, or permit juries to
award damages as seem just. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1983), supra note 8
(permitting recovery to parents for their grief and mental suffering "in such amount as,
under all the circumstances of the case, may be just").
Damages in cases of wrongful death of minor children are particularly difficult to
determine because of speculation as to the child's life expectancy, future earnings, and
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III. HISTORY OF TORT LAW AND THE UNBORN CHILD
The common law did not allow broad tort recovery by or for
the unborn child. Justice Holmes applied the common law rule
in 1884 in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,s° when he
stated that an unborn child is a part of its mother and that any
injury to the child that was not too remote was recoverable by
the mother on her own behalf. 21 Because an unborn child was
not separate from its mother, the parents could not recover for
prenatal injuries to, or death of, the fetus. United States courts
followed the common law rule22 until 1946.23
A. History of Recovery for Prenatal Injury
In 1946 the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia deviated from the common law rule in Bonbrest v.
Kotz.24 In Bonbrest, an infant sued through its father for inju-
ries sustained during delivery. The court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and distinguished the case from
Dietrich on the ground that the infant in Bonbrest had survived
to prove that it could live apart from its mother2 5 Since the case
involved a viable fetus, and since the fetus had demonstrated its
capacity to survive, the Bonbrest court reasoned that it could
not deny the child standing in court.2 6 The Bonbrest court
rejected the common law rule, noting that the common law is an
other factors relevant to determining pecuniary loss. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 908-
09. Regardless of this difficulty, courts have allowed recovery in many wrongful death
cases involving minor children. Id. at 909. Washington allowed recovery for the wrongful
death of a minor child prior to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010. See Upchurch v. Hubbard,
29 Wash. 2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947), overruled on other grounds, Sargent v. Selvar, 46
Wash. 2d 271, 280 P.2d 683 (1955). Washington now specifically allows recovery for the
wrongful death of minor children under WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010. See supra note 8.
20. 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled, Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446,
225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
21. Id. at 17.
22. According to the 1939 Restatement of Torts, "a person who negligently causes
harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 869 (1939).
23. Prior to 1946, one notable critic of the rule was Judge Boggs, who argued that a
child should be considered a legal entity when it reaches viability. Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hoasp., 184 Ill. 359, 370-74, 56 N.E. 638, 641-42 (1900) (Boggs, J. dissenting), overruled,
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
24. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
25. Id. at 140.
26. "Here, however, we have a viable child-one capable of living outside the
womb-and which has demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving-are we to say
now it has no locus standi in court or elsewhere?" Id. (emphasis in original).
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ever-changing phenomenon.21
United States courts quickly incorporated the Bonbrest
holding into the common law. According to Dean Prosser, Bon-
brest and the cases that followed it "brought about what was up
till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well set-
tled rule in the whole history of the law of torts."28 All states
now allow recovery for prenatal injuries if the child is subse-
quently born alive.29
When an injured fetus is subsequently born alive, viability
at the time of injury is not a determinative factor.8 0 Courts have
either ignored the viability question when the injured fetus was
subsequently born alive"' or have expressly stated that the issue
is irrelevant.32
B. History of Recovery for Wrongful Death
After permitting recovery for an injured fetus that is subse-
quently born alive, courts began to recognize a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a child who died because of prenatal
injuries. Courts first recognized a cause of action when the child
was born alive and then died.3
27. "The common law is not an arid and sterile thing, and it is anything but static
and inert." Id. at 142.
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 336. See Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,
152 Ohio St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1949) (in which the Supreme Court of Ohio
was the first state court of final jurisdiction to hold that a viable fetus was a person and
could maintain an action after birth for prenatal injuries).
29. Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. Rxv.
639, 642 (1980).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 337. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich.
718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (allowing recovery to child for injuries sustained by it as a
nonviable fetus); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (allowing
recovery for injury to a three-month-old fetus). Note, however, that most cases arise out
of injuries to a viable fetus.
31. E.g., Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
See infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
32. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960):
[T]he viability distinction has no relevance to the injustice of denying recovery
for harm which can be proved to have resulted from the wrongful act of
another. Whether viable or not at the time of injury, the child sustains the
same harm after birth, and therefore should be given the same opportunity for
redress.
Id. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504.
33. See, e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (Super. Ct. 1977)
(court allowed a wrongful death action when a fetus was injured during the fourth month
of pregnancy, was born prematurely two months later, and died the day after birth);
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (court allowed
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Courts justified the action on two bases. First, most wrong-
ful death statutes provide a right of action for the death of a
person.' The child who is born alive has always been considered
a "person."' 5 Second, most wrongful death statutes limit the
action to cases in which the decedent might have recovered
damages from the tortfeasor if death had not occurred. 6
Because the child who lives can recover for prenatal injuries, it
follows that the child's statutory representative can recover for
wrongful death.
When a fetus sustains injuries and is stillborn, courts are
divided as to whether to allow a wrongful death action. 7
Although some states do not allow the fetal wrongful death
action,38 the majority of states allow wrongful death actions for
the death of a viable fetus3 9
wrongful death action when child died two-and-one-half hours after birth). See Note,
The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 349, 358 (1971). Viability is not an issue when the injured fetus is born alive
and then dies. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 116, 453 A.2d
1198, 1206 (1983) (when a fourteen-week-old fetus was injured and died less than three
hours after birth, court held that the concept of viability had no role in the case).
34. For example, see Washington's wrongful death statute:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of
another his personal representative may maintain an action for damages
against the person 'ausing the death; and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1983).
35. Note, supra note 33, at 358.
36. This is true whether the statute is modeled after Lord Campbell's Act or after a
survival act. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 910. See supra note 18.
37. Note, Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus: A Common Law Solution to a
Statutory Dilemma, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 819, 821 (1982). The first court to allow recovery
for the wrongful death of a stillborn viable fetus was the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
38. Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 1980); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Egbert v. Wenzl,
199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Scott v, Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d
959 (1981); Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
39. Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
224 A.2d 406 (Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d
557 (Super. Ct. 1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volk v.
Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d
368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale
v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.
1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 637 (La. 1981) (rehearing opinion); Odham v.
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An overwhelming number of courts do not recognize a right
of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus."0 Only
Georgia and Rhode Island have deviated from the general rule
and have allowed recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus."
Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass.
354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss.
269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); White v. Yup,
85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249
(1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980);
Werling v. Sandy, No. 1-83-4, slip op. (Ohio 3d App. D. Apr. 30, 1984); Evans v. Olson,
550 P.2d 924 (Okl. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974);
Presley v. Newport Hasp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244
S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hasp., Inc., 139 Vt. 138,
425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v.
Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
40. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 421 A.2d 134 (1980):
To deny a nonviable fetus a cause of action ... is simply a policy determina-
tion that the law will not extend civil liability by giving a nonviable fetus a
cause of action for negligence before it becomes a person, in the real and usual
sense of the word, by being born alive. In other words, life may begin at con-
ception but causes of action do not.
Id. at 679, 421 A.2d at 136-37.
Note, however, that the concept of allowing recovery to the child for its injuries is
not necessarily the same as allowing the parents to recover for the death of a fetus. The
former does not seem justifiable to courts that concur with the Wallace court because
these courts do not want to allow recovery to someone who is not a person. In the latter
case, recovery is to the parents, not to the child. Arguably, the parents suffer equally
when a fetus has been killed, whether or not the fetus was viable.
Most courts that have allowed recovery for the death of a viable fetus have expressly
stated that the fetus was viable at the time of injury. See, e.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. at 371, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
41. The Court of Appeals of Georgia allowed recovery for the death of a six-week-
old fetus. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). In Porter, the court
found that the fetus had been able to move at six weeks. The court held that for the
purposes of Georgia's wrongful death statute, a fetus is a child when the fetus is "quick,"
or perceived to move in the mother's womb. Id. at 716, 87 S.E.2d at 103. Cf. Shirley v.
Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980) (wrongful death action not allowed for
the death of a fetus that was two months old at the time of injury, because that fetus
was not "quick").
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a fetus is a person for the purposes of
the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act whether the fetus is viable or nonviable. Presley v.
Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). In Presley, the court discussed the
issue of viability despite the fact that the fetus was viable at the time of injury. "[A]s our
holding in this case indicates, the decedent, whether viable or nonviable, was a 'person'
within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act.... It would be palpably illogical to
discredit viability in one context [prenatal injury] only to rehabilitate it... in another,
integrally related context [wrongful death)." Id. at 188, 365 A.2d at 754. But see State v.
Amaro, - R.I. -, 448 A.2d 1257 (1982) (fetus held not a person under the vehicular
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C. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
The relatively new torts of "wrongful birth"'42 and "wrongful
life"'48 are the most recent extensions of tort law as it applies to
the unborn child. Under a wrongful birth action, the parent sues
for the birth of a child who would not have been born but for
the negligence of a third person." Wrongful life is an analogous
tort action by the child, who claims that he or she would not
have been born, and presumably would not have had to suffer,
but for the negligence of a third person.45 In discussing viability,
this Comment will draw analogies between these torts and
wrongful death actions for unborn children, but a thorough
analysis of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
homicide statute, so the cause of action was dismissed when a nine-month-old fetus was
killed in a collision).
Other jurisdictions have not followed the decisions of the Georgia and Rhode Island
courts. See supra note 40.
42. See generally Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (wrong-
ful birth claim by parents of a child born with Down's Syndrome stated a legally cogniza-
ble cause of action); Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in
Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713 (1982); Comment, Berman
v. Allan, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 257 (1979); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
The Washington Supreme Court has defined a wrongful birth action as "an action
based on an alleged breach of duty of a health care provider to impart information or
perform medical procedures with due care, when the breach is a proximate cause of the
birth of a defective child." Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d
483, 488 (1983) (emphasis added).
43. See generally Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (the
court reviewed the status of the wrongful life cause of action in the United States); Rog-
ers, supra note 42; Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TuL. L.
REv. 480 (1980). In a wrongful life action:
The child does not allege that the physician's negligence caused the child's
deformity. Rather, the claim is that the physician's negligence-his failure to
adequately inform the parents of the risk-has caused the birth of the
deformed child. The child argues that but for the inadequate advice, it would
not have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the
deformity.
Id. at 485 (emphasis in original).
The Washington Supreme Court expanded the above definition by permitting
actions for "negligent performance of a procedure intended to prevent the birth of a
defective child: sterilization and abortion." Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d
460, 478, 656 P.2d 483, 494 (1983).
44. The parents claim either that they would not have allowed the pregnancy to last
its full term if they had known that the child would be defective, or that the physician
negligently failed to prevent the pregnancy. See, e.g., Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 465-66,
656 P.2d at 488.
45. Id. at 478, 656 P.2d at 494.
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IV. RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJURY AND FETAL WRONGFUL
DEATH
Arguments for and against allowing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries or death of the unborn child were asserted in
the earliest cases on the subject.4" Modern courts and scholars
advance essentially the same arguments.47
The major arguments against recovery for prenatal injuries
include: (1) lack of precedent;48 (2) inseparability of the fetus
from the mother;49 (3) difficulty of proof of causation; 50 (4) dan-
ger of double recovery by the mother;6' (5) potential of fraudu-
lent claims;52 and (6) legislative prerogative.53
Courts have refuted each of the above arguments in arriving
at the now unanimously accepted rule that an action exists for
prenatal injuries to a child who is born alive. 4 The argument of
lack of precedent has not been valid since 1946, when Bonbrest
was decided. Lack of precedent was not a strong argument even
then, for as the Bonbrest court stated, "[tihe absence of prece-
dent should afford no refuge to those who by their wrongful act,
if such be proved, have invaded the right of an individual. ' '55
Courts used similar reasoning to refute the arguments that cau-
sation would be too difficult to prove, and that fraudulent claims
might arise.5 6 Problems of proof and possibilities of fraud exist
in many areas of law, but should not preclude action by an
injured plaintiff. Furthermore, courts have long recognized the
ability of the judiciary to make law. 7
As early as Bonbrest, courts refuted the contention that a
46. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), over-
ruled, Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977); Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 588-97 (1965).
48. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884), overruled,
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
49. Id. at 17.
50. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 310-11, 204 A.2d 140, 145 (1964).
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 338.
52. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944,
949-50 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.
1967).
53. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 581, 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 108 (1977).
54. Kader, supra note 29, at 642.
55. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946).
56. Id. at 142-43.
57. Id. at 142.
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fetus is merely part of its mother. 8 These courts pointed out
that the unborn child is recognized as a separate entity in
medicine59 and in other areas of law.60 Furthermore, under the
view that the fetus is a separate entity, double recovery does not
occur. The mother recovers for her own personal injuries, and
the child, or its parent on its behalf, recovers for injuries that
the child incurred as a separate being.
Each jurisdiction addressed and refuted the major argu-
ments against recovery before holding that the child born alive
has an action for prenatal injuries. 1 Courts address the same
arguments when deciding whether to allow recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus.2 Courts are beginning to realize that
the arguments that were invalid as to prenatal injuries are just
as invalid as to prenatal death.6
Opponents of the fetal wrongful death action add the argu-
ment that wrongful death statutes allow recovery only for the
death of a "person," and that a fetus is not a person." Oppo-
nents also argue that damages are too difficult to prove. 65
Despite these arguments, most jurisdictions now recognize a
cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.6 6
Proponents of the fetal wrongful death action point out that
it is unjust to allow recovery for injuries that do not result in
death, but to bar recovery for those injuries that are severe
58. Id.
59. As to a viable child being "part" of its mother-this argument seems to me
to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of
extra-uterine life-and . . . it is not a "part" of the mother in the sense of a
constituent element. . . . Modern medicine is replete with cases of living chil-
dren being taken from dead mothers. Indeed, apart from viability, a non-viable
foetus is not a part of its mother.
Id.
60. See generally Note, supra note 33 (discussing the law of property, the law of
equity, criminal law, and abortion law, with respect to the unborn child).
61. See Note, Prenatal Injury, 38 WASH. L. REv. 390, 392-95 (1963).
62. See, e.g., Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 600, 537 P.2d 266, 267-68 (1975).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 417
(1978). But see Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 581, 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97, 108 (1977) (stating that: (1) a fetus has no dependents, and no heirs other than the
parents; (2) the death of a fetus causes no economic loss, since it is not a wage earner;
and (3) the parents of a stillborn fetus have never touched, seen, or heard the child, but
have felt only random movements).
64. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 579, 565 P.2d 122, 132, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 107 (1977).
65. Justus v. Atchison, 53 Cal. App. 3d 556, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 150, 158 (1975),
aff'd, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
66. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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enough to kill.1 To overcome this inconsistency and to ensure
that justice does not favor the tortfeasor over the innocent fetus,
many courts have held that a viable fetus is a "person" under
the meaning of their particular wrongful death statute.s
One of the major arguments against allowing wrongful death
actions for the death of the unborn child is that damages are too
speculative.6 9 Opponents of the fetal wrongful death action con-
tend that plaintiffs cannot prove loss of support and services
from a child who was never born.70 However, courts can infer
67. See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982). In Volk, the
Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the trial court holding that a wrongful death action
could not be allowed for the death of a viable fetus. The court stated that "[a] holding
here affirming the trial court would... in effect reinstate the harsh rule of the common
law that a tortfeasor could be held liable for injury to a fetus, but be granted immunity
for the killing of the fetus." Id. at 574, 651 P.2d at 15. See also Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974).
A common illustration of this injustice is the "twin dilemma." Kader, supra note 29,
at 646. Suppose that viable twin fetuses are injured. One twin survives the injury to be
born alive. The other twin is more severely injured, and is stillborn. In a jurisdiction that
allows recovery for prenatal injuries, but does not allow a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death of the fetus, recovery would be allowed only for the injury to the twin that, by
chance, was least severely injured. This result is anomalous. Even more anomalous is the
situation in which the twin who was born alive dies soon after birth. In that case, the
wrongful death action would be allowed for the twin who was born alive, but not for the
twin who died before birth.
While the twin dilemma is purely hypothetical, it is physically possible, and demon-
strates the logical inconsistency of allowing recovery for prenatal injuries but not for
wrongful death of the fetus.
68. Note, supra note 33, at 359. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188
N.W.2d 785 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the word "person" as
used in the fourteenth amendment does not include the unborn. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 158 (1973). If read very broadly, this Supreme Court finding can be taken to negate
any argument that courts should allow wrongful death actions on behalf of the unborn
child, whether viable or nonviable at the time of injury. However, the Supreme Court
limited its statement that an unborn child is not a person to the specific terms of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
Conversely, opponents of abortion have argued that allowing recovery for the wrong-
ful death of a fetus requires a finding that a fetus is a person, and that the abortion
decisions are therefore wrong. See, e.g., Note, supra note 33. However, the decision to
allow abortion does not depend on the same policies and justifications as does the deci-
sion to allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus. While the fetus may not
be a "person" for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, it may be a "person" for
the purposes of a state's wrongful death statute. Furthermore, while a woman's right to
privacy is the policy involved in the abortion decision, the policy that a tortfeasor should
not escape liability is involved in the wrongful death decision. One decision does not
solve the controversy of the other.
69. W. PRossER, supra note 12, at 908. See supra notes 18-19.
70. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 53 Cal. App. 3d 556, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 150, 158
(1975), af['d, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
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that the unborn child would have had some earning power, just
as courts have inferred earning power in cases involving a child
who has died before reaching the age of majority." Where the
wrongful death statute does not limit recovery to pecuniary
damages, courts have held that parents may recover for the
mental suffering caused by the loss of a fetus.72 Most courts are
reluctant to preclude plaintiffs from bringing an action for the
death of a fetus merely because of the difficulties of proof
involved.7 8
Courts have accepted in large part the arguments in favor of
recovery for injury to the unborn child. All jurisdictions allow
recovery when the injured fetus is born alive.7 4 Many jurisdic-
tions allow recovery when a viable fetus is wrongfully killed.7 5
The arguments that courts use to deny actions for the wrongful
death of a nonviable fetus are the same as those that were used
to deny recovery for prenatal injuries,7 6 and to deny recovery for
the wrongful death of a viable fetus. If those arguments are
invalid as to the viable fetus, they are also invalid as to the non-
viable fetus, unless there are valid differences between viability
and nonviability that ought to affect recovery.
V. VIABILITY: AN ARBITRARY CUT-OFF
The history of recovery for injury or death of the unborn
child has involved arbitrary line-drawing by courts. Courts first
drew the line at birth. No recovery was possible if the child was
injured or killed before birth.7 8 The Bonbrest court stretched the
line by allowing recovery for prenatal injury of a viable fetus
who was born alive.7 ' The Supreme Court of Minnesota stretch-
ed the line further when it allowed recovery for the wrongful
71. See, e.g., Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d 327, 332-35, 501 P.2d 1228, 1232-
33 (1972) (discussing the methods used to impute future income of a seven-year-old
child).
72. See, e.g., Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 598-99, 537 P.2d 266, 266-67 (1975).
73. See, e.g., Jones v. Karraker, 98 IMI. 2d 487, 490, 457 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1983) (court
held that proof of actual loss of pecuniary services was unnecessary when jury awarded
verdict for wrongful death of viable fetus); Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177,
189, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976).
74. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 48-53, 61-65 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), over-
ruled, Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
79. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
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death of a stillborn viable fetus in Verkennes v. Corniea.80 Fetal
wrongful death cases after Bonbrest and Verkennes demon-
strated that a new line had been drawn at viability, rather than
at birth."' Modern courts, with two exceptions, draw the line for
allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus at
viability.s
Birth and viability are equally arbitrary lines for courts to
use in deciding whether to allow recovery for the wrongful death
of a fetus. Birth and viability are not the only possible lines, and
they are not necessarily the most logical lines. At least one state
has drawn the line at quickness. 83 The line could just as easily
be set at conception. " As courts have crossed each line, they
have asserted that the standard being rejected is arbitrary, and
that recovery is the most just result under the circumstances
before them.86 Currently, conception is the most generally
accepted line drawn for recovery for children who are injured
prenatally, but born alive. 86 For stillborn children, however, the
line is viability.87
Viability is as arbitrary a standard in wrongful death cases
as was birth.8s Viability depends upon many factors and varies
from case to case.89 Viability has no medical reality because of
80. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
81. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
82. The exceptions are Rhode Island and Georgia. See supra note 41.
83. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
84. See, e.g., Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
85. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838
(1962).
86. Kader, supra note 29, at 642. When the child is born alive, the point at which it
was injured is usually considered irrelevant, and courts rarely consider whether any line
is drawn. See Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (Super. Ct. 1977).
"The development of the principle of law that now permits recovery by or on behalf of a
child born alive for prenatal injuries suffered at any time after conception, without
regard to the viability of the fetus, is a notable illustration of the viability of our com-
mon law." Id. at 147, 380 A.2d at 1357.
87. Note, supra note 39, at 821. This is the majority view. A minority of jurisdic-
tions does not allow recovery for the wrongful death of the stillborn viable fetus. See
supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
This inconsistency raises a new "twin dilemma." Suppose that twin fetuses are
injured before viability. One twin is more severely injured, and is stillborn. The other
twin is born alive. In most jurisdictions today, the result would be recovery on behalf of
the twin who was born alive, regardless of how long it lived after birth. The parents
would not recover for the wrongful death of the stillborn fetus.
88. Gordon, supra note 47, at 589.
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 337. Viability is defined as: "Capability of living;
the state of being viable; usually connotes a fetus that has reached 500 g in weight and
20 gestational weeks." STEDmAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1556 (5th Unabridged Lawyer's
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these factors. The legal reality of viability developed out of the
historical need to explain that a fetus exists as a being separate
from its mother.90 In fact, modern medicine has shown that bio-
logical separability can occur long before viability 9
Legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes to prevent
injustices and to solve the problem that the tortfeasor was in a
better position when killing a plaintiff than when injuring the
plaintiff."2 Thus, most statutes limit wrongful death actions to
cases where the decedent might have recovered damages if death
had not occurred.93 In the case of the unborn child, the law still
leaves the tortfeasor in a better position when killing the non-
viable fetus than when injuring the fetus. Although the non-
viable fetus would have a cause of action for prenatal injuries if
it survived, most courts allow the cause of action to die with the
fetus.94
One explanation of the current inconsistency is that courts
are able to see the injustice of denying recovery when they can
also see the injured or defective child.9 5 But this explanation
relates to the issue of damages, rather than to the issue of
whether a cause of action should exist. Damages are easier to
prove for injury to a child who must bear the costs of the injury
ed. 1982) (emphasis added). Whether a fetus is capable of living will depend upon any
number of factors, including the health of its mother and the general state of medical
science. See, e.g., Green v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978) (court was unable
to hold as a matter of law that a fourteen-week-old fetus that weighed less than 120
grams was nonviable); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 352, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1252 (1977) (court pointed out that "fiun addition to the length of the pregnancy, viabil-
ity depends on other facts which include the weight ... of the child and the available
life-sustaining techniques.").
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 363-65, 157 A.2d 497, 502-03 (1960).
91. See Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953):
We ought to be safe in this respect in saying that legal separability should
begin where there is biological separability. We know something more of the
actual process of conception and foetal development now than when some of
the common law cases were decided; and what we know makes it possible to
demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception.
Id. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
92. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 902. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying
text.
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 910.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
95. See, e.g., Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 491, 431 A.2d 959, 961 (1981) (the court in
denying a wrongful death action for the death of a stillborn child argued that the still-
born child does not have to live with "the seal of the defendant's negligence"). This
argument is irrelevant when the wrongful death action is intended to compensate the
parents for their suffering and loss of their child, rather than to compensate the child.
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by living with it. However, just as difficulty of proof does not
justify denial of a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus,"' it should not justify denial of the same cause of
action for the death of a nonviable fetus.9 7 Regardless of the dif-
ficulty of proving damages, "[t]he loss incurred by the mother of
a three-month-old fetus should be not less compensable than
that of the mother of a seven-month-old fetus."'
Viability, like birth, is an arbitrary line. Courts have
rejected the viability criterion when the child is born alive. 9"
They should also reject the viability criterion when the child is
stillborn. The real difficulties in allowing recovery for the wrong-
ful death of a fetus are in proof of causation and damages.
Where causation and damage exist, viability should not be used
as a demarcation point.
VI. WASHINGTON LAW
The Washington Supreme Court has addressed the issues
involved in recovery for injury or death of a fetus on three occa-
sions.100 In addressing these issues, the Washington court has
refuted the basic arguments that have been used by other courts
to deny recovery for prenatal injuries to children who are born
alive and to deny recovery for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus.101
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet faced the issue
of the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. When it does, the
court should not draw the line of possible recovery at viability.
Instead, the court should examine the merits of the case in light
of the compensatory purpose of section 4.24.010 of the Revised
Code of Washington, the minor child wrongful death statute.0 2
96. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
97. Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 189, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976).
98. Kader, supra note 29, at 660..
99. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
100. In 1962 the court allowed a cause of action for prenatal injury to a viable fetus
who was born alive. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835
(1962). In 1975 the court held that parents had a cause of action for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus. Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975). In 1983 the
court recognized the torts of wrongful birth and wrongful life. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 113-37.
101. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
1984]
118 University of Puget Sound Law Review
A. Washington Statutory Law
The recovery accorded the parents of a fetus who is injured
or killed depends in large part on the interpretation of the term"minor child" in section 4.24.010 of the Revised Code of Wash-
ington.103 The statute allows recovery by the parents of a minor
child who is injured or killed. 10' If a fetus falls within the defini-
tion of a minor child, the statute allows recovery to the parents
of a fetus who is wrongfully injured or killed. However, Wash-
ington courts have not yet defined the limits of the term "minor
child."
The Supreme Court of Washington held in Moen v. Han-
son'0 5 that a viable fetus was within the intended statutory defi-
nition of the term "minor child" in section 4.24.010 of the
Revised Code of Washington.0 6 Although the court found that
no lower age limit was implied by the term, it specifically
declined to rule on whether a nonviable fetus was also within the
meaning of the term "minor child. '10 7
The minor child wrongful death statute and subsequent
judicial interpretation demonstrate the intent to compensate
parents for their own personal loss. 08 Recovery under the stat-
ute is not limited to pecuniary damages. 0 9 Instead, the statute
enumerates the damages that parents may recover for the death
or injury of a minor child." 0 In Wilson v. Lund,"' the Washing-
ton court held that the legislature intended the statute to cover"parental grief, mental anguish and suffering."" 2
103. See supra note 8.
104. Although WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 is not exclusively a wrongful death stat-
ute because it deals also with actions for injury to a minor child, the courts refer to
WASH. Rav. CODE § 4.24.010 as the "wrongful death statute" when a case involves the
death of a minor child. See, e.g., Balmer v. Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d 367, 368, 502 P.2d 456,
457 (1972). See supra note 8.
105. 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975).
106. Id. at 599, 537 P.2d at 267.
107. Id. at 599-601, 537 P.2d at 267-68.
108. Id. at 598-99, 537 P.2d at 266-67.
109. See supra note 8.
110. Allowable damages include expenses that are actually incurred, loss of services
and support, damages for loss of love and companionship, and damages for harm to the
parent-child relationship. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010, supra note 8.
111. 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971).
112. Id. at 97, 491 P.2d at 1291.
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B. Washington Case Law
In 1962 the court faced the issue of recovery for prenatal
injury for the first time in Seattle-First National Bank v.
Rankin.11  Recognizing the "clear trend""" of judicial decisions,
the court allowed recovery to a child for prenatal injuries. The
court stated that to permit recovery was "the more just rule." 115
The Rankin court recognized that to allow recovery could lead
to difficult problems in proving causation, but stated that
"[d]ifficulty of proof does not prevent the assertion of a legal
right.""' 6
In 1975 in Moen v. Hanson,"7 the Washington Supreme
Court allowed a wrongful death action by the father of a viable
fetus. The court held that a viable fetus was a "minor child"
within the meaning of section 4.24.010 of the Revised Code of
Washington.' Although the court did not consider whether a
nonviable fetus was also a "minor child," 9 the court stated that"no lower age limitation is implied by the term."' 20 The court
discounted the defendant's claim that the action should not be
allowed because of the difficulties of proof and the possibilities
of fraudulent claims. 12 1
The Moen court rejected birth as the line to be used in
113. 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
114. Id. at 291, 367 P.2d at 838.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975) (action by a father for the wrongful death
of an eight-month-old fetus after both mother and fetus died as a result of injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident).
118. Id. at 599-600, 537 P.2d at 267.
119. Id. at 601, 537 P.2d at 268.
120. The court stated that the term "minor child" marks the age of majority as the
point beyond which wrongful death actions must be brought under WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.010, the state's primary wrongful death statute, rather than under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.010, the minor child statute. Id. at 599, 537 P.2d at 267. Washington's primary
wrongful death statute, WASH. Rsv. CODE § 4.20.010, authorizes a right of action by the
personal representative of a "person" who is wrongfully killed. The statute is typical of
the wrongful death statutes of many states because it allows recovery for pecuniary dam-
ages when the decedent would have been entitled to recover damages if death had not
occurred.
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of
another his personal representative may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death; and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1983).
121. Moen, 85 Wash. 2d at 601, 537 P.2d at 268.
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allowing a wrongful death action.'22 The court cited the logical
inconsistency of the twin dilemma, in which one twin is born
alive and the second twin is stillborn.'23 The court noted that
"[d]enial of recovery to an unborn child tortiously killed, on the
arbitrary grounds that the child did not survive the tort long
enough to be born alive, is eminently illogical.' ' 24
Moen involved the death of a viable fetus, and the Moen
court specifically avoided deciding "whether recovery can be had
for injury to a nonviable fetus.' 25 However, the court observed
that "a parent's bereavement does not depend on whether or not
the child survives to full term.' 26 Similarly, a parent's bereave-
ment will not depend on whether the child was viable or non-
viable at the time of injury or death. 2 7 The Washington
Supreme Court has not had to address a case of prenatal injury
or death of a nonviable fetus.22 However, the court refuted, in
Rankin and Moen, the arguments against such recovery.
In 1983 the Washington Supreme Court recognized two new
causes of action, "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life," in Harbe-
son v. Parke-Davis, Inc.129 The Harbeson court may have
answered indirectly the question that was left open in Moen.5 0
Although the Harbeson court fashioned two new causes of
action, the court, by allowing recovery for the birth of a defec-
tive child, effectively allowed recovery for an injury sustained
before viability.'I' The Harbeson court defined the wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions narrowly, excluding cases of
wrongful conception and excluding cases in which a healthy
child is born.1 2
122. Id.
123. Id. See supra notes 67 and 87 for discussion of the twin dilemmas.*
124. Moen, 85 Wash. 2d at 601, 537 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 599, 537 P.2d at 267.
127. One can argue that the parents' attachment grows as the term of pregnancy
progresses. However, even if true, this argument relates to the issue of damages, rather
than to the existence or nonexistence of a cause of action.
128. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 covers both injury and death of the minor child.
Moen dealt specifically with the issue of wrongful death, but interestingly, the court
chose to use the word "injury" in the statement quoted in the text. It is unclear whether
the court meant to say "injury," or "death," or whether the court meant both.
129. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 462, 656 P.2d 483, 486 (1983).
130. "[W]hether recovery can be had for injury to a nonviable fetus." Moen, 85
Wash. 2d at 601, 537 P.2d at 268.
131. But viability was not considered sufficiently relevant to warrant discussion.
132. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 467, 478-80, 656 P.2d at 488, 494. See also supra
notes 42-43.
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If birth of a defective child, caused by the negligence of a
third person, is the issue, then these actions are not substan-
tially different from actions for recovery for prenatal injuries, as
covered by section 4.24.010 of the Revised Code of Washington.
The Harbeson court based recovery in both the wrongful birth
and the wrongful life actions on the defect and the costs attribu-
table to the defect. 33 Furthermore, the court cited the minor
child wrongful death statute to show the legislative policy of
compensating parents for emotional injury."3 The emotional
injury experienced by the parents in Harbeson was not merely
for the birth of a child. The injury compensated was the birth of
a defective child.'35
Whether the actions in Harbeson had been called wrongful
birth and wrongful life, or recovery by the parents and the chil-
dren for prenatal injuries, the defects were at issue. Without
defects, the court would not have allowed the actions. The
defects in Harbeson were caused before viability. 36 Thus, the
Harbeson court, without relying directly on the minor child
wrongful death statute, appears to have answered the question
left open by the Moen court.137 The Harbeson court permitted
recovery in Washington for injury to a nonviable fetus. The next
logical step would be to allow recovery for the wrongful death of
a nonviable fetus.
VII. CONCLUSION
Viability is not a valuable criterion for deciding whether to
allow parents to recover for the wrongful death of a fetus. Via-
bility is a legal fiction that creates logically inconsistent rules.
Washington courts have taken the steps that lead logically
to permitting parents to recover for the death of a nonviable
fetus. Section 4.24.010 of the Revised Code of Washington dem-
onstrates legislative intent to compensate parents for their own
personal losses as a result of the injury or death of a minor child.
The extent of the loss must be decided by looking at the merits
133. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 477, 483, 656 P.2d at 494, 497.
134. Id. at 474-75, 656 P.2d at 492-93.
135. Id. at 476, 656 P.2d at 493.
136. The defects were caused by Mrs. Harbeson's use of the drug Dilantin. Because
Mrs. Harbeson took the drug during pregnancy, the children suffered from "mild to
moderate growth deficiencies, mild to moderate developmental retardation, . . . and
other physical and developmental defects." Id. at 463, 656 P.2d at 486.
137. See supra note 130.
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of each case. In order to do this, Washington courts must ignore
the arbitrary line of viability that other courts have drawn and
include the nonviable fetus' in the definition of a "minor child."
Washington courts will be able to look at each case individ-
ually if they do not distinguish between the viable and the non-
viable fetus when interpreting section 4.24.010 of the Revised
Code of Washington. Causation and damages will be difficult to
prove. These are problems that should be addressed in each
case, however. Difficulties of proof should not serve as absolute
bars to recovery. Burden of proof requirements are more rele-
vant, and less arbitrary, in cases of prenatal wrongful death than
is the requirement of viability.
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